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Whoso would undertake to give institutions to a People must
work with full consciousness that he has set himself to change,
as it were, the very stuff of human nature; to transform each
individual who, in isolation, is a complete but solitary whole,
into a part of something greater than himself, from which, in a
sense, he derives his life and his being; to substitute a
communal and moral existence for the purely physical and
independent life with which we are all of us endowed by
nature. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, law and legal systems have been viewed as performing
three major roles or functions in society: (1) the institutional role, which
includes allocation of authority or power and provides for ascertaining
rules of accepted interhuman behavior and the delimiting of sociolegal
relationships; (2) the conflict resolution role, which provides for the
orderly application of the legal rules; and (3) the interpretational role,
which includes the provision for sociolegal change and the redefining of
social relationships. But our analysis need not stop here since
sociological and behavioralistic studies of and approaches to legal
analysis may provide even greater insights into the synergistic or
interactional aspects of law within a functioning and ongoing legal
system, including such phenomena as the reciprocal nature of social
control within a legal system, the relatively positive attributes of some
forms of social deviance, the social function of reason, and the means
for and the effects of progressive sociolegal change. 2 As Professor
Robert Merton has stated:
Sociology need not make men wise or even prudent. But,
through its successive uncovering of latent social problems,
* A.B., Hamilton College; J.D., Case Western Reserve University; S.J .D. candidate,
Harvard University. Mr. Hildebrand is Cl'.rrently associated with a Japanese-American
law firm in Tokyo, and he is the author of SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EXEMPLAR
FOR OPTIMAL DECISION THEORY ANALYSIS (William s. Hein & Co. 1969).
This article is a modification of a chapter to appear in J. HILDEBRAND, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SOVIET LAW (William S. Hein & Co. 1972). All rights of future publication of this
article are reserved by the author.
1. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SocIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND
RoussEAU 205 (G. Hopkins transl. 1962).
2. The major problem in the area of legal sociology continues to be the lack of a
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sociological inquiry does make men increasingly accountable
for the outcome of their collective and institutionalized
actions. 3
For the most part the theories of sociological jurisprudence to date
have treated law as a passive rather than an active agent in social
change. From this perspective, law is viewed merely as responding to
new circumstances and social pressures; it is not seen in its heuristic,
educational, and opinion-creating roles. Obviously, this same feeling
pervades the other schools of jurisprudential thought to an even greater
degree. But such a view is becoming increasingly less tenable, especially
in recent years, as the great social effects of legal change within the
legal systems throughout the world have become too obvious to be
ignored. The question is no longer whether law is a significant vehicle of
social change; rather the questions are how it so functwns, what the
special problems are that arise, and how society can plan for optimal
systemic legal change. In a sense, laws and legal change constitute an
important social reality. 4
Today there is a need for a new synthesis springing from an
interdisciplinary analysis of the sociology of law and for a new typology
of the basic functions of a legal system. It may be useful, therefore, in
understanding the sociological obligations inherent in a legal system, to
expand the traditional view of the role and functions of law to include
those functions of social change and social conformity which are made
evident by viewing law and the legal system from a new sociological and
human interactional perspective.
As a starting point for this new typology of legal functions we might
posit an operational (and in large part Weberian) definition of
law-namely, law is a set of ought ideas which are held in the minds of
compehensive integration of jurisprudence and social research . One commentator has
noted :
Unless jurisprudential issues of the nature and functions of law, the relations of
law and morals, the foundations of legality and fairness, and the role of social
knowledge in law are addressed by modern investigators, the sociology of law
can have only a peripheral intellectual importance.
Selznick, The Sociology of La w, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
50, 58 (D. Sills ed. 1968) .

3. Merton, Social Problems and Sociological Theory, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS
697, 710 <R . Merton & R. Nisbet eds. 1961). Similarly, the problems which are brought

before the legal profession involve "questions of economics, politics, and social policy
which legal training cannot solve unless law includes all social knowledge." M. COHEN,
REASON AND LAW 83-84 (1950).
4. "Reality, then, in this distinctively human world, is not a hard immutable thing bu t
is fragile and adjudicated-a thing to be debated, compromised, and legislated." G.
McCALL & J. SIMMONS, lnENTITIES AND INTERACTIONS 42 (1966).
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a specific group of people, the effectiveness of which is increased by the
existence of an enforcement staff of specialists. In terms of social
system function, legal order can be defined as that sub-system within
any total social system characterized by a high degree of sub-system
differentiation, which has as its primary function the maintenance of
total system integration or equilibration. However, it should be stressed
that what I am suggesting is not a static equilibrium theory, but rather
social system equilibrium in an historical and evolutionary context.
Law must integrate the past with the present while making provision
for the future.
For the purposes of this discussion, the sociological functions of law
and the legal system can be grouped under the following nine headings:
(1) coercive role, which can be divided into the proscriptive function of
law-that is, law as a statement of what not to do-and the prescriptive
function-that is, law as a statement of how to act "rationally" within
the constructs of accepted communal behavior; (2) distributiv e
function-that is, law as a means for defining and delimiting sociolegal
relationships; (3) integrative function-that is, law as a means for
conflict resolution and the settlement of interpersonal and intergroup
disputes; ( 4) psychological function-that is, law as a means for
creating and maintaining the psychological and behavioral mentality or
frame of reference necessary for the continuance of the particular
sociolegal system; (5) legitimizing function-that is, law as a means for
"legalizing" both the existing sociolegal system and planned future
systemic change; (6) homeostatic function-that is, law as a means for
pattern maintenance and for equilibrating dysfunctional fluctuations
caused by systemic change; (7) educational and "parental"
function-that is, law as a means for channelling and rechannelling
societal interests and values as well as a means for guiding social
behavior; (8) heuristic function-that is, law as a force for creating and
stimulating opinion; and (9) self-actualizing function-that is, law as
a means for the positive creation of a statement of rules for orderly
sociolegal change and as a means for goal attainment within the context
of planned or programmed change.
As shown in Figure 1 below, these nine sociolegal functions can be
divided into groups of three under the general headings of presentperspective, past-retentive, and future-directive, or, similarly,
pragmatic, static, and dynamic. It is submitted that, when relatively
balanced, these three groupings of the social functions of law can and do
maintain the social system equilibrium in an historical and
evolutionary context, as discussed above.
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FIGURE 1

Tentative Typology for an Interactional Theory of Law
A. Present-Perspective
(Pragmatic Aspect)
1. Coercive Role
a. Proscriptive Function
b. Prescriptive Function
2. Distributive Function
3. Integrative Function

B. Past-Retentive
(Static Aspect)
1. Psychological Function
2. Legitimizing Function
3. Homeostatic Function

C. Future-Directive
(Dynamic Aspect)
1. Educational and
"Parental" Function
2. Heuristic Function
3. Self-Actualizing
Function

Obviously, within an ongoing sociolegal system these nine functions
overlap one another as well as interact within the general typology
presented here. Although these nine sociolegal functions are inherent in
almost any legal system, it should be apparent that the form and
content of the particular governing political structure may have the
effect, directly or indirectly, purposely or inadvertently, of placing
greater emphasis on some of these functions while limiting or
deemphasizing others. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the
sociolegal system as a whole is greater, in the Gestalt sense, than the
sum of its component parts.
In another article, I have discussed at length the "parental" and
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heuristic functions of law in the Soviet Union. 5 However, before
discussing the self-actualizing function of law in the Soviet context, it
may be useful to make a few brief statements concerning the "parental"
and heuristic functions, not only for an understanding of the Soviet
legal syste~, but also for an increased awareness of the role and
functions of law within any dynamic social system.
The heuristic function of law is that aspect of a legal system by which
individual or collective opm10ns concerning social and legal
relationships are created or stimulated through the interaction that
takes place between the law and social behavior. It might also be called
the "propagandistic" function-in the positive as well as negative sense
of the word. The ideology and avowed political philosophy of a social
system, as well as its practiced variations, can affect to a large measure
the heuristic function of law within that system. 6 The extent to which
the heuristic function is emphasized in a sociolegal system depends
upon the effect of ideological, cultural, and traditional constructs upon
the "content" of the law within the general societal framework.
In comparison, the notion of the educational and "parental" function
of law focuses on the role of law as a guiding teacher and parent. The
"parental" aspect of Soviet law and the Soviet legal system has been
described by Professor Harold J. Berman as follows:
Implicit in the Soviet legal system is a new conception of the
role of law in society and of the nature of the person who is the
subject of law. The Soviet legislator, administrator, or judge
plays the part of a parent or guardian or teacher; the
5. Hildebrand, The Sociowgy of Sovie t Law: The Heunstic and "Parental " Functions.
22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 157-229-(197-1).
6. For an excellent discussion of the ideological differences of perspective that juristic
political scientists bring to bear upon their teaching, research, and writing, see Schubert.
Academic Ideowgy and the Study of Adjudication, 61 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 106 (1967). See
also Mendelson, The Neo-Beh avioral Approach to the Judicial Process: A Cntique, 57 AM.
PoL. Sc1. REV. 595 (1963); Miller, On the Interdependence of Law and the Behavioral
Sciences, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 1094 (1965).
With respect to the self-actualizing function, political ideology can also have a
conservative effect on the systemic behavior of the sociolegal system; for example, the
idealized tenets of a pluralistic democr~cy may create dilemmas in effectuating "legal"
foreign policies as well as ideologically compatible domestic policies. See J . HILDEBRAND,
SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EXEMPLAR FOR OPTIMAL DECISION THEORY ANALYSIS chs. iv &
viii (1969); C. LINDBLOOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965); Q. WRIGHT, PROBLEMS OF
STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 275 n.6 (1954). For an analysis of the
tendency of "legalistic thought" to assume, promote, and enforce an ideology of consensus
and agreed-upon rules, see J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964). See also Carlin & Howard, Legal
Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381 (1965); Ericksen & Ericksen,
Ideological Aspects of the Legal Profession, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 290 (1957); Grossman, Social
Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Makinfl_, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966); Swett, Cultural
Bias in the American Legal System, 4 LAW & Soc'y REV. 79 (1969).
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individual before the law, 'legal man,' is treated as a child or
youth to be guided and trained and made to behave. I have
called this the 'parental' aspect of Soviet law, though it should
be understood at the outset that the concept of parentalism
does not necessarily imply benevolence. 7
Professor Berman's analysis of the "parental" nature of Soviet law
provides an excellent-and to date unsurpassed-sociological
description of that particular sociolegal function. The "parental" or
educational function of law is generally conceived in the various
analyses of the Soviet legal system, as well as in related analyses of
most other legal systems, in terms of its unidirectional and institutional
aspect-that is, the state being a parent or guiding teacher to the
citizen:
To speak of 'parental law' is ... not so much to describe the
state which proclaims and applies the law as to describe the
assumptions which are made regarding the nature of the
citizen and his relationship to the state. To say that under
Soviet law the state has extended the range of its interests and
its powers is not enough. The state has sought in law a means
of training people to fulfill the responsibilities now imposed on
them-and it has made this function of law central to the
whole legal system. 8
However, the concept of the "parental" and educational function of
law need not be limited to the unidirectional and institutional concept of
"parental law." As shown in Figure 2 below, the "parental" or
educational function can be viewed as either unidirectional, as it is
generally conceived in the Soviet Union and in most other legal systems,
or as interactional within the general societal system. It is submitted
that the interactional perspective more closely approximates reality in
almost any given legal system-the child is often father (or parent) to
the man (or the state).
7. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 6 (rev. ed.
1963). See generally id. at 277-384. The "parental" aspect of Soviet law has also been discussed under the heading of "paternalism." See Campbell, The Legal Scene: Proceduralists and Paternalists, SURVEY: A JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, No.
57, Oct. 1965, at 56-66.
8. H. BERMAN, supra note 7. at 284.
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FIGURE 2
The Unidirectwnal and Interactional Perspectives
Parental Function
(unidirectional)
LAW
t> BEHAVIOR

Parental Function
(interaction al)
LAW~ BEHAVIOR
Parental Function
(in teractional)

When modeled on a time-scale, the interactional perspective of the
sociolegal system assumes an ever-increasing synthesis and integration
as shown in Figure 3 below. This effect is representative of sociolegal
systemic change, or what Alfred Korzybski has referred to as man's
time-binding capacity. 9

FIGURE 3
Paradigm for Time-Scale Representation
of the Interactional Perspective
1
Law

~w

/eha~
2 •

.,_Behavior 2

~/~
Lawn

Behavior n

9. See A. KORZYBSKI, MANHOOD OF HUMANITY 91-92 (1921).
Admittedly, the time-scale representation in Figure 3 lacks the general systems th eon:
concept of goal-changing feedback, which Professor Karl W. Deutsch has defined as
including "feedback readjustments .. . of those internal arrangements which implied [the
system's] .. . original goal, so that the net will change its goal, or set itself new goals
which it will now have to reach if its internal disequilibrium is to be lessened." Deutsch,
Some Notes on Research on the Role of Models in the Natural and Social Sciences, 7
SYNTHESE 506, 515 (1948-1949) . See also J. HILDEBRAND, supra note 6, at 102-103, 121-28:
Maruyama, The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Proces.-;es, 51
AM. SCIENTIST 164 (1963). Figure 3 could be modified to represent a. simple systems
analysis, however, by drawing feedback loops from Law nl to Law 2. Law 1, and Behavior 1
and from Behavior n to Behavior 2, Behavior 1 and Law 1 as follows:
'
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This increasing synthesis and integration, which is also the social
function of reason, should not be limited in its goal to the technocratic
slogan of "prediction and control," but ought to include reasoned moral
choice which, in the area of sociolegal change, further accentuates the
interactional perspective. The Soviet legal system, like most Western
legal systems, does not expressly recognize this social function of
reason, but rather stresses (in the unidirectional sense) the role of
"socialist law" in implementing preestablished ideological constructs.
The Soviet legal system can be characterized not only by the unique
emphasis placed on the "parental" and heuristic functions of law, but
also by the emphasis placed on the self-actualizing function of
law-that is, the role of law as a means for the positive creation of a
statement of rules for orderly sociolegal change and as a means for goal
attainment within the context of planned or programmed systemic
change. The ideology and political philosophy of Soviet-Marxism are
based on a relative concept of the perfectibility of man, and in part it is
through the operation of the interim or transitional legal system of
socialist law that the goal of true communism and public selfgovernment is hoped to be attained in the Soviet Union. Socialist law is
conceived as having an important role to play in implementing preestablished ideological constructs within the Soviet Union.
The self-actualizing function of law in the Soviet context will be
discussed in this article under the general headings of (1) the
perfectibility of man, (2) the ideology of law, (3) the resulting
habituation, and (4) dysfunctionality.
II.

THE PERFECTIBILITY OF MAN

The perfectibility of man is an optimistic idea which is pervasive in
the writings of Hegel and Marx. While this idea is common to other
social theorists, Hegel's and Marx's respective versions of it are among
the most elaborate and the most suggestive. As Professor John
Plamenatz has stated:
It is the idea of perfectibility which receives at their hands
dimensions unknown in the eighteenth century because Hegel
penetrates more deeply into the human mind and Marx into
the social processes affecting that mind. Though their versions
of this idea may be open to criticism on other grounds, they are
hardly touched by most of the criticisms levelled at the
Hegelian and Marxian social philosophies. It would be a pity if
this idea, so largely and rightly associate<J with them, were lost
in the general condemnation of their systems. It is an idea
which deserves to be extracted from those systems and to be
considered on its own merits. 10
10. J. PLAMENATZ,
403 (1963).

MAN AND SOCIETY: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY, BENTHAM THROUGH

MARX
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Stated briefly, the concept of the perfectibility of man views man in
the historical and inevitable process of coming to understand himself as
a self-conscious creature aware of himself and his fellow humans as
living in a relatively coherent society which can be rationally explained
and thus coming to acquire in progressive stages a set of values which
are more adequate to his nature and condition than any set of values
previously developed. This ideal is not just another elucidation of the
old Stoic and Christian idea of an eternally valid moral law, a higher
law of reason, a supposedly self-evident law which anyone capable of
understanding and defining human nature can see applies to any
human being in his dealings with other such beings. In contrast
(although not necessarily mutually exclusive), the perfectability of man
is based on the humanistic belief that man can rationally determine not
only the validity of his present and past value systems but can also
direct his future sociocultural development. Even if we hold with the
position of Hume and many other contemporary philosophers that
moral rules differ from factual statements as well as from
mathematical and logical propositions, and even if we agree that an
"ought" cannot be derived logically from an "is," we need not
categorically reject the perfectibility concept of Hegel and Marx. 11
Regardless of what we may personally believe to be the correct
explanation of moral rules and value judgments, we need not be
precluded from agreeing with Marx and Hegel that men gradually
acquire rules and values adequate to their present nature and social
condition, a process which is not only accretive over many generations
but may also modify its end-goal objectives. (Our increased
consciousness is altered not only by quantitative leaps in information
and understanding but also by the actual processes of our reaching each
new level of consciousness.) To paraphrase Professor Plamenatz, rules
and values are at least minimally adequate to numan nature and the
human condition whenever men are so placed, psychologically and
socially, that their desires and ambitions are in keeping with one
another and with the rules and values they mutually or reciprocally
accept, and when the functional means are not lacking to realize these
values and rules. 12
Rousseau firmly believed in the "natural rights" of the individual. He
saw man's usual condition in society to be such that there arise passions
incompatible with one another and with the rules and values man is
taught to accept. Therefore, man only half accepts these rules and value
judgments, he is by no means free of their influence, and yet he cannot
live by them in practice because of his natural passions. For Rousseau
11. See id. at 403-04.
12. Id. at 404.
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the fundamental political problem was "to find a form of association
which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person
and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself
with all, may still obey himself above, and remain free as before." 13 In
order to attain this goal, each individual must by a social contract
sacrifice all his natural rights to the community as a whole. However,
this does not necessarily mean a resulting loss in liberty: "Each man, in
giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no
associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields
others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and
increase of force for the preservation of what he has." 14 Not only the
passions, but also the values are social products; they are human
products and result from man's social condition. According to
Rousseau, man's passions and values are such that he cannot live a
satisfying life, a life in which his passions and his values are in
harmony and he has the means to get what he most strongly desires.
Rousseau condemned nearly all human societies because they make it
impossible for man to live a satisfying life, or, as he put it, "a life
according to nature." 15
Rousseau imagined an ideal society which would be free of the defects
of actual society. He did not believe, however, that the development of
this ideal society was inevitable or that knowledge was the panacea for
all man's social ills. It is in this regard that Hegel and Marx differ most
substantially from Rousseau. Both Hegel and Marx imagined a long
process of social, intellectual and moral evolution which would lead
man steadily and inevitably to that level of ·consciousness where he
would comprehensively understand himself and the world, and where
his passions would be in harmony with his values and his ambitions
could be realized with the means at his disposal. Man would no longer
be alienated from his society, but rather he would be "whole" and secure
in the social world which would be both the product and the sphere of
his activities. 16
If we denv-and most critics of Marxism do denv it-that
there is any such steady and inevitable process, we are not
bound in logic also to deny that there is a set of rules and
values, a moral system, which all men would accept if they
understood the nature and social condition of man, a system in
keeping with the passions and ambitions which would be
strongest in them if they and other men had that
understanding. We may admit this possibility, even though we
13.
14.
15.
16.

RoussEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. I, ch . vi(G. Cole transl. 1913).

Id .
See J. PLAMENATZ, supra note 10, at 404-05.
Id. at 405.
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are at pains to insist, against the Stoics and against Rousseau,
that there is no eternally valid moral law in the sense of a set
of moral rules which can be derived logically from a true
description of human nature or of the divine purpose for man.
We can also hold, quite consistently, both that there is a moral
code which men, having reached the condition, social and
intellectual, enabling them to conceive of it, can see is the most
fully adequate to their nature and condition, and that all other
moral codes, though each is received while social conditions are
propitious to it, are inadequate in the sense that men, in those
conditions, acquire passions and ambitions difficult or
impossible to satisfy and not in keeping with the moral code
they accept. In other words, we can, without logical
inconsistency, accept both the moral relativism of Marx and
his belief that there is a morality more adequate than the
others because it is what men are moved to accept when they
have come to understand themselves and the world, when they
have taken their own measure and have cheerfully assented to
it: a morality they are unlikely to abandon because the
understanding which brings it in ·its train also educates their
passions and ambitions to conform with it. 17
There may have been <indeed there may still be) primitive
communities where men's passions and values were so much in
harmony that what Marxists cai'l alienation did not exist. In such
communities, if they have ever existed, the moral and sociocultural
values were again "adequate" to human nature and man's social
condition. Hegel and Marx both assumed that most men would be
rational and moral if placed in the right social environment, and that
the causes of alienation were mostly social and would eventually
disappear.
Recognizing the obvious alienation which exists in all civilized
countries today, at least four simplistic theories of social change and
cultural development might be posited. First, optimistically and despite
intermittent regressive periods, man is manifestly destined to progress
to ever higher levels of understanding and social adequacy wherein his
moral and cultural values will attain greater equilibrium with his
nature and social condition. Second, man has already attained his
highest level of sociocultural progress, and therefore he should attempt
to maintain (or reclaim) in the future those respective levels of
perfection which have been achieved in the past. Third, man is passing
ceaselessly through a cycle of change and disequilibrium. Fourth,
regardless of whether man has actually attained any true heights of
sociocultural perfection, he is destined by his inherent nature to reach
increasingly lower levels of sociocultural decay.
In the following two paragraphs Professor Plamenatz has succinctly
17. Id.
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summarized Rousseau's, Hegel's and Marx's respective approaches to
social change and cultural development:
Rousseau and Hegel both suggest that men, when their
passions and values are not in keeping with one another, are
profoundly unhappy; they are, as the common phrase has it,
'untrue to themselves,' or, as Rousseau put it, 'outside
themselves,' or as Hegel says, alienated. They are in a painful
condition possible only to rational creatures, and only reason
can find a remedy for it. As Hegel sees it, men, when they
reflect on this condition, strongly desire to change it; they
strive, at first confusedly but more deliberately and hopefully
as their understandin~ grows, to set themselves and society in
order. They make their way slowly to a condition where their
passions and values are-in harmony with one another, where
their ambitions are within their powers, where self-respect is
possible, where life, though strenuous, seems worth all tl~e
effort it calls for, where men need look for nothing outside
themselves arid the societies they have created to console them
for being alive. Rousseau describes the evil but suggests no
practicable remedy for it; Hegel has more to say than
Rousseau about its social and historical causes and makes bold
to predict an inevitable remedy. Rousseau's pessimism is
excessive, being as much an effect of temperament as
supported by cogent argument, and Hegel's optimism is not
better grounded. But it is, or may be, more useful; it is
encouraging and perhaps also, to some extent, a guide to
action. Though we do not believe that what Hegel predicts
must come true, we may, insofar as we find it good, sharing his
idea of freedom, strive to make it come true.
Marx, like Hegel, is an optimist, but in at least one respect,
he is more plausible than Hegel. He foretells great social and
political changes before what he thinks desirable can come to
be, before there can be a morality adequate to man's nature
and his social condition. Man is still alienated; he is still so
situated, socially and culturally, that he is impelled to strive
for what does not satisfy him, that he lives, not as he would
live if he knew how, but as the market requires. He may not
accept wholeheartedly the values of bourgeois society but,
unless he is consciously a revolutionary, he does not reject
them either; and if he is revolutionary, he cannot live by the
values he accepts, for society will not let him. Man in bourgeois
society, as Marx depicts him, is still short of the knowledge and
self-knowledge [true consciousness] needed to out an end to
alienatwn; he has still to make great changes in society and to
be himself greatly changed before his condition is such that
what he strives for is within his reach and seems to him full y
worth while, before he sees himself and his situation as they
really are and wants what he can get and what will satisfy
him. Though Marx says too little about the society of equals to
make it clear just how he conceives of the freedom which is (so
he thinks) the condition of men's living truly satis~ying lives,
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol1/iss1/2
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he does not find his ideal, as Hegel does, fully realized in the
nation-state of his own century. He is, in this, both truer to the
ideal which he shares with Hegel and more realistic. For their
ideal is also, at bottom, the ideal of Rousseau and Kant: that no
man should be the mere instrument of other men, and that all
men should be able to live in accordance with principles they
inwardly accept. They differ from Rousseau in being
altogether free from parochialism and obscurantism, and from
Kant in the interest they take in the cultural and social
conditions of freedom. Marx is truer ... to this ideal than
Hegel, not in giving a clearer account of it, not in speaking
more profoundly about freedom and equality and how they
stand to one another, but in refusing to admit that it could be
achieved in the kind of social and political order which
satisfied Hegel. There existed in Hegel's time and in Marx's, as
there still exists today, a widespread desire for greater
freedom and greater equality, a wide-spread striving after an
ideal which was deeply attractive though not clearly defined;
and there was also a strong belief that freedom could not be
much enlarged unless there were greater equality. Though
Hegel spoke more eloquently and even perceptively of freedom
than ever Marx did, it is not too much to claim that Marx held
the more firmly of the two to the common ideal. 18

It would be absurd to argue that the Hegelian and Marxian concept of
the perfectibility of man is beyond criticism. But regardless of whether
we reject their accounts of social evolution, or accept it, or be strongly
attracted to it, we must also conclude, as rational beings, that the ideal,
though perhaps never to be realized completely, is indeed worth striving
for.

III.

THE IDEOLOGY OF

LA w

For the purpose of this discussion , an ideology can be defined
essentially as an action-related system of ideas. An effective ideology
must contain a program and a strategy for its realization, and a major
purpose of an ideology is to unite organizations which are built around
it.19
18. Id. at 406-07.
19. See Friedrich & Brzezinski, Totalitarian, Ideology, in POLITICAL THEORY AND IDEOLOGY 123 (J. Shklar ed. 1966). For a discussi0n of the motivational role of Soviet Ideology, see Fleron & Kelly, Personality, Behavior and Communist Ideology, 21 SOVIET
STUDIES 297 (1970). See also Bell, Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of
Soviet Behavior, 10 WORLD POLITICS 327 (1958); Chambre, Soviet Ideology, 18 SOVIET
STUDIES 14 (1967); Daniels, The Ideological Vector, 18 SovIET STUDIES 71 (1966); Joravsky,
Soviet Ideology, 18 SovIET STUDIES 2 (1966); Meyer, The Functions of Ideology in the
Soviet Political System: A Specu/,ative Essay Designed to Provoke Di,scussion, 17
SoVIET STUDIES 273 (1966); Redaway, Aspects of Ideological Belief in the Soviet
Union: Comments on Professor Meyer's Essay, 17 SOVIET STUDIES 473 (1966); Wesson,
Soviet Ideology: The Necessity of Marxism, 21 SovIET STUDIES 64 (1969); Wesson, The
Soviet State, Ideology and Patterns of Autocracy, 20 SovIET STUDIES 179 (1968) .
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The Soviet jurists and social theorists currently stress two aspects
concerning the relationship between the Marxist concept of law and
ideology. The first is that ideology exercises an influence on law. Since
law is created by men, it stands to reason, state the Soviet-Marxists,
that law is necessarily "an expression of definite ideological moti\tes, or
in other words, the rules of law are laid down by the state authorities in
accordance with the ideology of the classes wielding the power." 20 The
second aspect is that law also exercises an important influence on social
and individual consciousness:
Just as socioeconomic, political and other factors must pass
through the consciousness of the law-maker, and take the form
of ideological motives to find expression in law, so legal rules
do not influence social relations automatically, but by
exercising an influence on the consciousness and behaviour of
men. In this context, law plays an important ideological, or as
it is sometimes called, educational role in society. By making
definite ideas, principles and rules of behaviour mandatory for
all, encouraging their observance and holding out the prospect
of punishment in the event of non-observance, the law
promotes the elaboration of definite views, principles, motives
of behaviour, etc. 21
The treatment of the problems of social structure and social change
by Soviet jurists and social theorists remains immaculately doctrinal,
despite some current efforts by Soviet sociologists to bring into the
doctrinal framework a certain awareness of actual social realities. For
those Marxists who operate on an intellectual level of gross
oversimplification, law is a class phenomenon and it is indissolubly
bound up with the state; law and coercive legal institutions will wither
away in the future classless and stateless communist society. The state
of true communism will be accompanied by a great material abundance
and society will be ruled by the principle "from each according to his
abilities, to each according to his needs," thus making superfluous the
substantial premise of law on the need to exercise control over the
measure of consumption. 22 "In virtue of its social wealth and very high
level of consciousness of its citizens there will be no need either for the
authorities to impose any special bans or sanctions. Human relations
will no longer require such legal regulation as protection of one person
20. THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW 196-97 (V. Chkhikvadze ed. 1969). Professor V. M.
Chkhikvadze is head of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' Institute of State and Law.
21. Id. at 197.
22. Assuming first the "great material abundance" and second an effective distribution
system so as to make operationally possible the tenet "from each according to his abilities,
to each according to his needs,'· there still remains the inescapable problem of how to
determine what constitutes an individual need. Clearly what someone may "want" ma:v
not be what he "needs." Furthermore, should some persons be entitled to greater needs? A
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against another through the courts and measures of state compulsion." 23
The Soviet social theorists are quick to point out, however, that the
withering away of law does not mean that there will be no rules of
appropriate behavior in communist society at all. "No society is possible
without definite rules of community life, and a highly organized society
is inconceivable without distinct and generally accepted social rules." 24
The Soviet-Marxists further argue that it is incorrect to assume that the
theory of the withering away of the state and law implies either a
negative attitude or a Marxist hostility for law. "The Marxist
proposition about the withering away of law under communism," state
the Soviet jurists and social theorists, "is merely a statement about its
future, and should not be taken as an assessment of its past or present
role." 25
Of course, the Soviet-Marxists continue to maintain that the state
and law will wither away in time-that is, will be dissolved in public
self-government and in the rules of communist community living.
However, they also now state that this process "will take a rather long
historical period, during which study of the urgent problems of the
state and law constitutes one of the chief requirements of scientific
management of the very process of withering away of the political-legal
superstructure." 26 Nevertheless, they maintain that "there is every
reason to assume that the theory of socialist law, the theory of the
socialist state, will develop in the future into the theory of public selfgovernment, into the science of the rules of human behavior, into a
very frank statement recognizing this problem was made by S . G. Strumilin at the
conference of the Economics Institute in June 1950:
Before speaking about distribution according to needs, the needs being
referred to must be clearlv defined. The needs of the members of the communist
society are the needs of educated, cultured peopl e who do not abuse their
opportunities of obtaining consumers' goods. A science of consumption is already
being created now. An Institute of Nutrition, which studies rational norms of
nourishment, exists in the U.S.S.R. People's requirements under communism
will be extremely diverse and individual, but on an average there must be a
gravitation toward fixed norms which would completely satisfy the needs of
socially developed people. R eports and Dic;cussions: On the Mean.-; fo r the
Gradual Transition from Socialism to Communism, Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 10.
1950, at 99, translated in 3 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIET PREss, No. 2, Feb. 24,
1951, at 7.

See also Sherman, Th e Economics of Pure Communism, 21 SovIET STUDIES 24 (1970):
Wiles. A Comment But Not a Rejoinder, 21 SovIET STUDIES 37 (1970).
23. THE SovIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 20, at 198-99.
24. Id. at 199.
25. Id. at 200.
26. Ideology, Science, Life: Th e Science of Law in the Conditions of Communist
Construction, Kommunist, No. 16, 1963, at 26. translated in 15 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE
SovIET PRESS, No. 49, Jan . 1, 1964, at 19, 23.
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most important part of the complex of sciences of guiding the
development of the communist socioeconomic formation." 27
Is there any likelihood of breaches of social rules under communism?
The Soviet jurists and social theorists currently answer this question as
follows:
Of one thing we may be sure: not on the old scale. However,
even such a highly organized society as communism cannot be
immune from possible departures from the generally accepted
rules of community life, which may result from pathological
emotions; there may be breaches of official duty or accidental
clashes between men, etc. But the point is not whether these
are possible or not, but whether, because of the highly
conscious and active attitude of the people around, they will be
immediately cut short without the participation of any special
state bodies. Lenin spoke of the need to suppress various
excesses under communism as well, and emphasised that this
would not require any special machinery of suppression,
because the people would do it themselves 'as simply and
readily as any crowd of civilized people, even in modern
society, interferes to put a stop to a scuffle or to prevent a
woman from being assaulted.' These swift social reactions will
spring from a sense of collectivism, and the assurance that any
person engaged in suppressing an excess will immediately find
public support. A deeply ingrained sense of collectivism, as
man's second nature, is a condition for the withering away of
the law. 28
From the perspective that it is the social being of men-that is, their
practical activity and its social conditions that are the basis on which
their consciousness develops-the Soviet social theorists view law as
having an important ideological task to perform. This ideological role of
law tends generally to increase, especially in epochs of great social
change. "Legal acts give explicit expression to principles and ideas
behind the new social system, thereby becoming mandatory for all." 29
Thus law becomes an important self-actualizing means for social
transformation and systemic change, demonstrating new models of
social relations:
Law determines the behavior of men and regulates their
most important relations, thereby exercising a substantial
influence on the course of social development as a whole. Once
it has arisen, it acquires a relative independence in respect of
the socioeconomic system, and may either go along with social
(including economic) development or run against it ... .
At any rate, law is never passive in respect of the
27. Id.
28. THE SOVIET S TATE
29. Id. at 197 .

AND L AW ,
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socioeconomic system and always operates as an important
factor in consolidating the social relations which have taken
shape, in some cases actively promoting the establishment of
new relations, whenever the necessary material conditions are
there. Law also exercises a palpable influence on the economy,
and the more complex the economic mechanism of a society
organised as a state, the stronger is the influence it exerts in
many concrete directions. 30
While the role of socialist law in effecting social transformation and
systemic change is admittedly great, the Soviets frequently complain
that Wes tern commentators often distort the Marxist thesis concerning
the ideological role of law:
Because the rules of law are specific in that their execution
may be ensured through state coercion, some authors draw the
conclusion that Marxism regards the educational role of law as
boiling down to the influence exercised on men's consciousness
and mentality by methods of coercion and repression.
Naturally, this portrayal of the educational role of law turns
out to be incompatible with the rights and freedoms of citizens,
so that criminal law becomes the main instrument of
education. 31
According to the Soviet social theorists, as the Soviet Union evolves
into a true communist society a "new Soviet man" will concurrently be
fashioned. Of course, this objective must be considered in light of the
tremendous social changes which are now taking place throughout the
world, both in communist and non-communist countries. The general
collapse of traditional social frameworks and ways of life in face of the
techno-cultural revolution may be bringing about the emergence of a
new mass breed of man all over the face of the earth. But the unique
feature of the "new Soviet man" is that his sociocultural development is
to be planned and guided. 32
Although the presence of a conscious and centrally planned strategy
for social change has historic parallels in Russia's own history under
Peter the Great, as well as in Meiji Japan, and in Ataturk's Turkey, in
the Soviet case
we have the distinctive combination of planned social change
instituted from above, centrally directed and executed by a
body whose occupational role is that of effecting change,
backed by the power and all the economic and political force
which a totalitarian regime can muster, guided by a central
30. Id. at 190-91.
31. Id. at 197-98.
32. The 1961 U .S.S.R. Communist Party Program set forth in detail the blueprint for
the creation of the "new Soviet man." See The New Program of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MARXISM 371-486 (A. Mendell ed. 1961).
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theory or ideology, carried out at a relatively unprecedented
rate, and extending into every dimension of social life. 33
In 1960 an authoritative Soviet work entitled The Foundatwns of
Communist Educatwn, compiled jointly by the Academy of Social
Sciences attached to the Party Central Committee and the R.S.F.S.R.
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, stated in a chapter entitled
"Construction of Communism and the Education of the New Man":
One of the most important aspects of the radical
reorganization of society during the transition from capitalism
to socialism, and subsequently its further development from
socialism to communism, is the education of the new man. This
is an inseparable, organic part of the struggle for socialism and
communism, without which the victory of the new order is
altogether impossible. Socialism and communism cannot be
consolidated without a fundamental change in the
consciousness of people, their views, mores and habits. 34
The goal of creating the "new Soviet man" is based on the Marxian
concept of the perfectibility of man, as discussed above. The Soviet
social theorists see a vital connection between the material and
technical base and the emergence of the "new man." Since people's vices
are conditioned by the nature of the social order, it has been argued by
many utopian social theorists that a new society must be created before
maximum human potential can be realized. However, before you can
create a new society you must create a new people. Scientific socialism
found a way out of this apparent dilemma by claiming that both human
beings and their social conditions can be changed simultaneously. Man
transforms his social environment, which at the same time transforms
him. Thus, the creation of the new Soviet man, "the splendid man of the
communist future," is an absolute necessity for the Soviet social
theorists. Without the "new Soviet man" there can be no "material and
technical base," without the "material and technical base" there can be
no "new man," and without one or the other there can be no true
communist state.
What, then, is the new Soviet man to be like? Continued Party
pronouncements and statements by leading Soviet social theorists
indicate that the "new man" will have the following six main
distinguishing features: (1) a wholly scientific approach to the world; (2)
a new attitude towards labor; (3) a new communist morality; (4)
proletarian internationalism combined with socialist patriotism; (5) no
mental survivals of bourgeois capitalism (which includes a new attitude
33. A. INKELES, SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOVIET RUSSIA 4 (1968).
34. 0SNOVY KOMMUNISTICHESKOGO VOSPITANIYA (THE FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNIST
EDUCATION] 5 (Moscow ed. 1960), translcted in Pismenny, The "New Man," 4 STUDIES ON THE
SovIET UNION, No. 1, 1964, at 49.
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towards property); and (6) immunity to the influence of bourgeois
Western ideology. All of these characteristics can be related to the
cardinal communist virtue of a boundless zest for work, with additional
emphasis on the time-honored virtues of honesty and diligence. Thus,
acquisition of a wholly scientific approach to the world does not signify
only an accumulation of knowledge, but "occurs ... above all in the
process of socially productive and political activity." 35 Communist
morality means not only "utter devotion to the cause of communism"
but "is expressed in concrete deeds: in honest labor for the good of the
people, in the preservation and multiplication of social wealth." 36
Socialist patriotism means not only to serve one's motherland but also
"to be a frontline fighter everywhere and in everything-in the factory,
in the fields, in the ranks of our glorious armed forces ... in science and
technology." 37 Even proletarian internationalism is rooted in labor, in
the production of economic and cultural wealth and values to serve as
models for the socialist nations.
To quote the 1960 Soviet treatise on The Foundations of Communist
Education again: "The most important thing in a communist education
is the development of a communist attitude towards labor. Among the
multifarious qualities of a man in a communist society, first place must
be assigned to the ability to work for society ... and concern for raising
labor productivity." 38 Under communism, labor is to be transformed
into a voluntarily accepted obligation to society.
In comparison, the 1970 antiparasite and "refusal to work" law
promulgated in the Russian Republic reflects a more coercive approach
to the Soviet masses' voluntary obligation to work according to its
capabilities. 39 Under this law a person accused of living a "parasitic way
of life" shall be given a warning by the police stating that he should find
suitable work. If the individual does not find such work within 15 days,
the local government is compelled to assign him a job in the general
region where he lives. If he then "maliciously refuses" to work, he is
liable to criminal charges and could face up to a year's deprivation of
freedom or corrective tasks for the same period.
35. Kommunist, No. 5, 1964, at 53, translated in Pismenny, supra note 34, at 50.
36. Id. at 59, translated at 51. See also Glezerman, Society, the Collective and the
Individual, Pravda, Oct. 31, 1966, at 3, translated in 18 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET
PRESS, No. 44, Nov. 23, 1966, at 15; Chkhikvadze, The Individual and the State: Mutual Responsibility, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 1, 1971, at 19, translated in 23
CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIET PRESS, No. 9, Mar. 30, 1971, at 1.
37. N. KHRUSHCHEV, 0 KOMMUNISTICHESKOM VOSPITANII (ON COMMUNIST UPBRINGING] 174
(Moscow ed. 1962). translated in Pismenny, supra note 34, at 51.
38. OsNOVY KOMMUNISTICHESKOGO VOSPITANIYA, supra note 34, at 24, translated at 51.
39. !<'or a discussion of the antiparasite and refusal to work laws, see Hildebrand, supra
note 5, at 206-13.
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Recent concrete sociological studies of work attitudes and individual
goals provide an interesting commentary on the present status of the
Soviet people's attitudes toward work. Some of the most striking
findings are those concerning the attitudes of Soviet youth. Even
though Soviet-educated, molded by the Komsomol (Young Communist
League), and socialized within the Soviet totalitarian system, these
young people still think and behave differently from what the leaders of
the system would optimally like. Rural youth characteristically leave
their villages and emigrate to the large cities at the same time the Party
needs workers in the rural areas to fill labor shortages. Very few
Soviet youths want to work at the new construction sites in the
rural areas where they are most needed. From the data presented
in Table 1 below, which has been compiled from local surveys
made between 1963 to 1967, 40 it appears that the highest percentage of
those who are prepared to go to work is to be found in the Estonian
Republic, an area which was not part of the Soviet Union until World
War II. The lowest percentage is in nearby Leningrad city and province,
an area which has been subject to long-time and strenuous Soviet
educational efforts. To paraphrase Professor Zev Katz: in the land of
"workers and peasants," very few of the youth want to be workers, and
much less peasants; the great majority want to go to college and to be
members of the "intelligentsia." 41
Of course, some of these phenomena, such as the high aspiration to
college, are a result of Soviet education and sBciocultural development.
The Soviet young people are more educated, more demanding, more
achievement-oriented in accordance with the Soviet-inculcated value
system. But this analysis may circumvent the more obvious
explanation.
Although the term "alienation" is not usually applied to the Soviet
worker, what is found by some sociological surveys in the Soviet Union
often amounts to very much the same thing. Almost all survey research
about Soviet youth shows a high incidence of labor turnover, of
dissatisfaction with work, transgression of labor discipline, deviant
40. See Z. Katz, Soviet Sociology-A Half-Way House, Oct. 1970, at 35 <Russian
Research Center, Harvard Univ.), citing V. Vodzinskaia. Vybor professii kak sotsial'
'pos' naia problema, 1968, at 7-8 (disserta.tion at Leningrad Univ.); Ya. Tkach, in ZHIZNENNYE PLANY MOLODEZHI 89-93 (Sverdlovsk ed. 1966); Shubkin, Youth Enters Life, Voprosy
filosophii, No. 5, 1965, at 62; M. Titma, in MoLODEZH I TRUD 72 (V. Yadov & V. Dobrynina
eds. 1970); Aitov, Obrazovanie rabochykh i ikh trud, Voprosy filosophii, No. 11, 1966. at 23.
41. Z. Katz, supra note 40, at ~4 . .Professor Katz's interesting and suggestive work has
been published in slightly different form in PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, May-June 1971.
For a discussion of the various social "classes" in the Soviet Union, see Labedz, Sociowgy and Social Change, SURVEY: A JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, No .
60, July 1966, at 18.
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behavior, and so on. Polls about political socialization show that the
Soviet youth are a serious problem. Despite the relatively high impact
of ideological motivation, for many young Soviet workers labor has not
become the personal need it was suppose to be.42 This is also indicated
by surveys about aspirations and motivations of the young people in the
Soviet Union. Whereas in early polls the usual aspirations of young
people were set in terms of "helping in building communism," "serving
the fatherland," "gaining approval of the collective," etc., 43 the result&
of recent studies look quite different. For example, Table 2 below sets
forth the results of a survey made in Leningrad in 1966. 44 It would
appear that volunteering for work at a new construction site was the
least attractive to the respondents, whereas "visiting other countries,"
"achieving material well-being" and "buying a car" were among the
main primary and secondary aspirations. However, as Professor Katz
has pointed out, "it is impossible to know how much of the manifest
change in aspirations is real and how much of it is due to the changes in
phrasing the questions and to the atmosphere of legitimization of such
answers in the U .S.S.R." 45

42. A. ZDRAVOMYSLOV, V. YADOV, CHELOVEK I CGO RABOTA fMAN AND His
WoRK] 292-96 (Moscow ed. 1969), English translation published by the International
Art~ and Sciences Press (!ASP). White Plains. New York. See also Yadov. Man and
His Work: Satisfied and Di,ssatisfied, Izvestia, Mar. 3, 1970, translated in 22 CURRENT
DIGEST OF THE SoVIET PRESS, Mar. 31, 197Q; . Zdravomyslov & Yadov, Soviet Worker's
Attitude Toward Work: An Empirical Study, in SOVIET Soc10wav: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND CURRENT APPRAISALS 347 (A. Simirenko ed. 1966).
43. But cf J. Glagolev, Methodology of Prognostication of Peace and Disarmament
Problems, paper presented at the VII World Congress of Sociology, Varna, 1970. See also
Katz, The VII World Congress of Sociol,ogy at Varna: An Encounter Between Two
Sociological Cultures, THE AMERICAN Soc10LOGIST, May 1971, at 177.
44. See Z. Katz, supra note 40, at 38, citing S. IKONNIKOVA & V. L1sovsKY, MoLODEZH o
SEBE, o SVEIKH AVERSTNIKAKH (Leningrad ed. 1969).
45. Z. Katz, supra note 40, at 39.
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TABLE 1

Life Plans of High School Graduates
Want to
study:

Want to
work and
study:

Want to
work:

Don't know,
no answer:

Total
respondents :

Leningrad (city and
province)

88.0%

3.0%

3.0%

9.0%

1872

Sverdiovsk (city and
one district)

84.6%

14.2%

1.2%

567

Novosibirsk (province) 80.0%

12.0%

8.0%

Kazan (city)

71.5%

10.2%

7.3%

11.0%

2000

Ufa (city)

65.3%

22.5%

3.7%

8.5%

2500

58.5%

12.0%

21.0%

8.5%

2260

Estonian Republic

In an effort to overcome bourgeois tendencies and to inculcate a new
social discipline in the masses, the Soviet social theorists have
continued to emphasize the ideological role of certain judicial and quasijudicial institutions. "Particular attention should be paid to the legal
education of [Soviet] young people and to inculcating in them a
consciousness of their high responsibility to society and to the state and
of a deep respect for all standards and rules of the socialist
community." 46

46. The Citizen and the Law, Izvestia. Sept. 22, 1970, at 1, translated in 22 CURRENT
DIGEST OF THE SovIET PRESS, No. 38, Oct. 20, 1970, at 14.
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TABLE 2

Leningrad Survey (1966 ):
"What are your aspirations for the near future?"
(Unlimited number of choices allowed)
Percentage
of 2,204
respondents:

First
priority:

Second
priority:

Total
answers:

10.6%

1,339

(1)

To get an interesting
and well-liked job

60.6%

89.3%

(2)

To get a higher education

59.7%

82.6%

17.3%

1,316

(3)

To visit other countries

57.5%

38.8%

61.1%

1,269

(4)

To achieve material well
being

54.9%

69.8%

30.1%

1,209

(5)

To achieve good housing
conditions

54.6%

72.7%

27.2%

1,202

(6)

To raise (professional)
qualifications

43.7%

81.4%

18.5%

965

(7)

To find true friends

43.2%

81.1%

11.8%

951

(8)

To raise children to be
exemplary human beings

41.8%

80.5%

19.4%

921

(9)

To meet one's love

41.5%

72.9%

27.0%

916

(10) To marry

32.0%

38.9%

61.0%

705

(11) To buy a car

31.4%

32.7%

67.2%

693

( 12) To get a secondary
education

22.0%

85.4%

14.5%

487

(13) To go to a new
construction site

18.4%

34.5%

65.4%

405

04) Other plans

6.7%

11.6%

8.3%

148

However, the self-actualizing function of law in the Soviet context is
not to effect the desired social transformation merely by overt coercion:
Undoubtedly, the prospect of juridical sanctions being applied
does exercise an educational influence on the less conscious
members of society for whom the observance of generally
accepted rules of behaviour is yet to become hamtual. But that
does not at all explain the ideological role of law. When, for
instance, Soviet doctrine speaks of the educational role of the
socialist law, it implies a broad range of questions constituting
the content of the law in force: the principles and rules of
behaviour it teaches men; the fact that, being fixed in law,
progressive ideas and views acquire especial force, because
they operate as the mandatory demands of society; that legal
regulation must not merely bind, but mainly convince men
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that the prescribed behaviour is right, so that the laws
themselves must be observed consciously and voluntarily and
not under pain of punishment. 47
IV. THE RESULTING HABITUATION

48

The Marxist-Soviet social theorists contemplate a process whereby
man will become habituated to the observance of his communal social
duties. They often speak of the "new Soviet man" becoming
"accustomed" or "acquiring habits" appropriate to the developing
communist state of public self-government. The socialist law and legal
system are viewed as having key roles to play in developing the
appropriate social consciousness:
The role of law in the life of society is considerable and takes
on a special form in social consciousness which is the
consciousness of law, that is a system of views and concepts on
law, its social purpose and key institutions. Marxist theory
devotes great attention to the problem of consciousness of law
but it does not in any sense reduce it to the role of the
consciousness of law in the application of law. It is the wider
problem of studying their comprehension of law and the
attitude taken to it by the broadest masses of the population. 49
There is little indication that the Soviet social theorists view the
resulting habituation as an openly interactive process wherein the
common man can directly affect (and thereby change or abolish) the
institutionalized forces which are establishing the appropriate behavior
patterns. Rather, the Soviet social theorists seem to view the habituation process as unidirectional, whereby relatively "distant" forces, such
as the professional Party leaders, induce observance of the new social
norms through a process of accommodation utilizing certain legal and
social organizations. There is no immediate indication that the
subservience of the legal system to Party control will be eliminated.
A few Soviet jurists and social theorists have at times discussed the
educational use of the legal and legislative processes in terms which
seem to imply direct interaction of the educators and the educated. 50
47. THE SovIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 20, at 198 (emphasis added).
48. Portions of this section are based on D. Funk, Law as Schoolmaster: Rule of Law
Implications and Soviet Theory, June 1968, at 30-31, 77-83 (Unpublished M.A. thes is in
Ohio State University Library ).
49. THE SovIET STATE AND LAW, supra note 20, at 198. "The Marxist-Leninist science of
law ... must actively influence the consciousness of the working people and must
propagandize and strengthen the democratic principles of life in Soviet society."
Zhogin, Questions of Soviet Law: Abreast of the Times, Izvestia, Jan. 22, 1964, at
translated in 16 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 3, Feb. 12, 1964, at 24,25.
50. See, e. g. , Golunsky, The Creative Revolutionary Role of Socialist Law in the Period
of the Comprehensive Building of Communism, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 10,
1961, translated in 1 SovIET LAW AND GOVERNMENT, No. 1, Summer 1962, at 13, 22.
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Here again, however, the creative participation of the masses is
conceived in terms of collective participation and not individual
disturbance to the existing sociolegal system. This concept is consonant
with the idea of socialist democracy, which calls for "the broadest
participation of the masses in the administration of society and the
state." 51
The resulting habituation theme appears fairly consistently in
Marxist-Soviet writings from Lenin to contemporary times. Lenin, for
example, stated in State and Revolution that:
very soon the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental
rules of everyday social life in common will have become a
habit. The door will then be wide open for the transition from
the first phase of communist society to its higher phase, and
along with it to the complete withering away of the state. 52
In this same work, Lenin further indicated that when the stage of true
communism is ultimately reached
there will vanish all need for force, for the subjection of one
man to another, since people will grow accustomed to the
observance of the elementary rules of social life that have been
known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all
school books; they will become accustomed to observing them
without force, without compulsion, without subordination,
without the speC'i,al apparatus for compulsion which is called
the state. 53
And again, Lenin stated that the state will be able to wither away
"when people have become accustomed to observe the fundamental
rules of social life, and their labour is so productive that they [will]
voluntarily work according to their ability." 54 For Lenin it was clear
51. Savitsky, Democracy, Legality and the Individual, Izvestia, Feb. 20. 1969. at 2.
translated in 21 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIET PRESS, No. 8, Mar. 12, 1969, at 20.
The tendency of the modern phase of Soviet law is to continue the polic~· of
subordination of individual interests to the commands and the interests of
society, and to eradicate from the psyche of the Soviet citizen the element of
assertiveness in regard to the rights of the individual. Social reforms on which
communist society is predicated stress coordination. discipline. and conformity.
The message of the social order in the Soviet society addressed to the individual
is that through collective action the welfare of the individual is to be achieved .
The state and public authority appear in the public eye as the benefactors of all.
K. GRYZBOWSKI, SoVIET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: DocTRINEs AND SocIAL FUNCTIONS
169-70 (1962).
52. v. LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION 84 (lnt'l Publishers ed. 1968).
53. Id. at 73-74.
54. Id. at 79-80. Similarly, one year later, Lenin wrote that "in communist society
democracy will gradually change and become a habit, and finally wither away." V. Lenin,
The Proletarian Revolu tion and Renegade Kau tsky, 3 SELECTED WORKS 87 (Moscow ed .
1960). See also Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, in BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS
AND PHILOSOPHY 68, 105-06 (L. Feuer ed. 1959).
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that in the true communist state man must attend to his social duties
through "habit," that is, having become "accustomed" to the
appropriate communal behavior patterns.
During the Stalin era, A. Y. Vvshinski addPil that in the highest
phase of communism, "[a]ll will learn to get along without special rules
defining the conduct of people under the threat of punishment and with
the aid of constraint." 55 He also stated that people will be "so
accustomed to observe the fundamental rules of community life that
they will fulfill them without constraint of any sort." 56 It was also
about this time that S. A. Golunskii and M. S. Strogovich wrote that in
communist society
[t]he rules of life in common will be observed without the
restraint exerted by a state mechanism, solely by virtue of the
conscious discipline of the communist social order, respect for
each other and for their common interests, and established
habits which have become part of a mode of living. 57
Numerous Soviet social theorists have continued to make the point
that observance of the norms of communist society will become
habitual. For example, G. Shaknazarov, writing on communist society,
has emphasized that the rules of social behavior must become a habit,
that there must be a "habitual sense of collectivism" and that one of the
most important tasks of communist education is to instill proper
behavior patterns in the masses until they become second nature. 58 The
Comrades' Courts and the Peoples' Volunteer Militia are viewed as
contributing significantly to this task. 59 A. I. Denisov has added that:
From the time when all [the people] are administering social
affairs on their own, the observation of the fundamental rules
of human society will gradually come to be a universal habit,
obviating the need for that apparatus of organized and
systematic compulsion called the state." 60
Similarly, Ye. Klyenov has stated that:
The advance of Soviet society toward communism requires
steady intensification of educational work among the people
and the creation of conditions that will make the observance of
55. A. VYSHINSKI, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 52 <1948) .
56. Id.

57. Golunskii & Strogovich, The Theory of State and Law, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
351, 399 (H. Babb. transl. 1951).
58. Shaknazarov, From the State of Communist Selj~Governm ent, Politicheskoe
samoobrazovanie, No. 8, 1960, trans/,ated in 1 SOVIET REVIEW, No. 4, 1960, at 54, 60-61.
59. See Hildebrand, supra note 5, at 198-206.
60. Denisov, On the Relationship of State and Society in the Period of Transition from
Capitalism to Communism, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No . 4, 1960, at 29, translated
in 12 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 22, June 29, 1960, at 17, 19.
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rules and regulations become a human habit, and work a vital
human necessity. 61
In a more extended statement, N. Mirenov seems to foresee the
replacement of state compulsion by habituation after a process of
reeducation:
In socialist society compulsion therefore remains an important
means of eradicating crime. Later on, of course every citizen
will observe the laws voluntarily, out of deep inner conviction
and awareness of moral duty, by force of habit. But until they
do, the state must uphold law and order by applying
compulsion. It now becomes a matter not of rejecting
compulsion but of gradually narrowing the sphere of its
application, spearheading punitive measures against
imperialist agents, confirmed criminals, dangerous recidivists
and others who do not lend themselves to reeducation. 62

One of the pronouncements of the 1961 New Program of the
Communist Party was that in communistic society proper social norms
will become a habit for everyone. 63 In a more recent statement, P. S.
Romashkin has claimed that "the conscious and voluntary observance
of the rules of socialist community-already second nature to most
Soviet people-must become a habit with all members of society,
making compulsion by the state superfluous," since one of the necessary
requisites of the emergence of the conditions necessary for true
communism is observing "the rules of the communist way of life as a
matter of habit." 64
Through a process of education, the disciplined, goal-oriented,
striving, energetic, optimistic, productive "new Soviet man" will be
habituated so that he will conform to proper social norms and values
without state compulsion. This educational process is to be effectuated
through the use of certain iudicial and quasi-judicial institutions (the
regular courts, the Comrades' Courts, and the Peoples' Volunteer
Militia), th us ultimately enabling man (it is hoped) to live in an
organized communist society without alienation and without the
coercive institutions of state and law.
Most Soviet social theorists have not concerned themselves with an
analysis of the specific type of educational process in which they
61. Klyenov, Public Participation in Settling Labor Disputes, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i
pravo, No. 1, 1960. translated in 2 SovIET REVIEW, No . 11, 1961, at 34.
62. Mironov, Persuasion and Compulsion in Combatting Antisocial Acts, Kommunist.
No. 3, 1961, translated in 2 SovIET REVIEW, No. 9. 1961, at 54, 61.
63. The New Program of the Communi-;t Party of the Soviet Union, supra note 32, at
458, 466.
64. Romashkin, Th e Soviet State and Law at the Contemporaru Stage, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF SovIET LAW; 7, 14 (P. Romashkin ed. & Y. Gdobnikov transl.. no date).
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propose to utilize certain sociolegal institutions. However, this may
sometimes be inferred from their descriptions of the educational
process itself. In addition, underlying the whole communist program is
the general idea that the Communist Party, as the vanguard of the
revolution, must be the decision-making body which will decide how
man is to be remade in preparation for the evolving communist state. In
general, therefore, the "new Soviet man" is merely subjected to the
educational process, and it is not intended that he should directly
influence society's ultimate goals by his own individual participation
and interaction within the institutionalized sociolegal system .
Recent Soviet literature indicates that the educational process
utilizing certain judicial and quasi-judicial institutions can be
categorized as authoritarian. It is common for Soviet jurists and social
theorists in discussing the educational use of legal institutions in
changing man to refer to a process of "instilling" or "inculcating" new
social attitudes, new labor discipline, and so on. They also refer from
time to time to the process of "molding," "shaping," and "refashioning"
the new Soviet man. Comrades' Courts are viewed as playing an
educational and indoctrinational role. 65 Similarly, the regular court's
role as educator and "propagandist of Soviet laws" is said to be fulfilled
if the trial is well organized and the sentence is correct. 66 Moreover, the
courts are to continue their activity "aimed at influencing people who do
not submit to the rules of socialist society and who resist education." 67 These terms and the actual use of certain judicial and quasijudicial institutions are indicative of an authoritarian bias in the resulting educational process.
For the purposes of this discussion, authoritarian education can be
defined as that process whereby individuals are guided in developing
appropriate attitudinal and behavioral patterns by external influences
which do not permit direct individual interactive participation in
determining the communal tenets and mores to be inculcated. Professor
Sydney Hook has described authoritarian education as follows:
We shall ... call those tendencies in education authoritarian,
which, by blocking the roads of inquiry, prevent freedom of
intellectual choice; which, by discouraging critical
participation in the processes of learning, obstruct individual
growth; which, by imposing dogmas of doctrine or program,
blind students to relevant alternatives and encourage
conformity rather than diversity; which, in short, fail to
65. See Hildebrand, supra note 5, at 200-06.
66. See id. at 213-21.
67. Rudenko, Intensifying the Struggle Against Especially Dangerous Crimes, Izvestia,
May 7, 1961, at 5, translated in 13 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 18, May 31,
1961, at 21.
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recognize that the supreme and ultimate authority, the final
validating source of all other authorities in human experience
is the self-critical authority of critical method-or
intelligence. 68
Professor Horace M. Kallen has described the authoritarian element
as follows:
In the history of teaching, such words as 'indoctrination,'
'instruction,' 'inculcation' give away the persistent relation
of teacher to pupil, of adult to child. It is a r.elation of superior
to inferior power, of hardness to plasticity, of authority to
dependence. The primary activities upon which the later
meanings of the words are variations, are activities of building
in, stamping in, talking in .... [C]ommonly the doctrines of
the inculcators are presented as self-evident ineluctable truths.
But it must be obvious that if they were such, indoctrination
would be unnecessary. If indoctrination is necessary, the
doctrines can be neither self-evident, nor ineluctable. 69
Authoritarian education can be contrasted with the pervasive ideal of
liberal democratic education which is "to achieve a community of
persons who, on the basis of reliable knowledge about themselves and
the world in which they live, can develop freely in a free society." 70
The main attributes of authoritarian education stand out clearly
from these discussions. The relation of teacher to pupil, of parent to
child, involves external dictation and imposition, formation by a
superior from without by means of indoctrination, to mold the pupil to
conform to the appropriate model which is in the mind of the guiding
teacher. The key factor in this authoritarian educational relationship is
that the teacher, as superior, necessarily recognizes no right in the
individual being taught to resist the molding process. The process is
that of unidirectional habituation, and not mere training or
conditioning. As Professor John Dewey remarked with respect to
authoritarian education: "[t]he philosophy is eloquent about the duty of
the teacher in instructing pupils; it is almost silent regarding the
privilege of learning," 71 or, we may add, of not learning.
If man is to be remade by a process of indoctrination, we may call this
educational use of legal institutions "authoritarian." The relationship
68. Hook. The Danger of Authoritarian Attitudes in Educatio11. in
117 (B. Johnson ed. 1964).

lssuEs IN EDUCATION :

AN ANTHOLOGY OF CONTROVERSY

69. H. KALLEN,

THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN: AN ESSAY TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCA-

TION FOR AMERICIANS 149 (1949). Cf C. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN: OR, REFLECTIONS ON
EDUCATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH IN THE UPPER FORMS OF

38-41 (1947).
70. Hook. supra note 68, at 117.
71. J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND
EDUCATION 71 (3d ed. 1966).
SCHOOLS
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between educator and the individual being educated here is strictly that
of superior to inferior, of parent to child. The individual is subjected to
the educational process and changed or educated whether he consents or
not. 72 It is not necessarily his "true nature" that is developed by the
educational process, nor is he necessarily permitted to affect or change
that process in any significant way.
Many persons consider a certain manner of operation to be a
necessary requirement for an institution to be call€d "legal." Since
Dicey's classic exposition, 73 operation in accordance with the rule of law
has often been considered one of these necessary requirements. Actions
which are not taken under reasonably specific rules are considered
administrative and therefore not legal. Discretionary administration
proceeds in an ad hoc fashion without reference to general rules, and it
usually appears arbitrary in comparison with the rule of law. However,
many actions of ordinary courts are not governed by rules to any
significant degree. For example, in the United States there are only
very broad rules governing such matters as the equitable division of
property of a husband and wife about to be divorced, the selection of a
specific criminal penalty (less than the maximum) to "fit the crime," or
the attributes of a "reasonable man" throughout the law of negligence
and contract. Similar difficulties exist in defining "contributing to the
delinquency of a minor," "monopoly and attempts to monopolize," and
in the determination of what charitable scheme is "as near as possible"
to the one that became impossible to carry out.
Nevertheless, to advocate the use of legal institutions according to the
rule of law doctrine is to advocate adherence to certain minimal
standards of formalized legal procedure and standards of substantive
legal content. 74 The rule of law, therefore, provides a standard by which
the operation of legal institutions may be judged.
In contrast, if a social reformer is advocating the use of legal
institutions for an authoritarian educational purpose (in an effort to
change or inculcate certain behavior patterns), he cannot expect the
legal institutions to operate strictly in accordance with the rule of law
doctrine in order to carry out this educational program. Instead, the
legal institutions must necessarily emphasize administrative action and
correspondingly decrease the rule of law. (Of course, he may not value
the rule of law as highly as the desired change in human nature or his
proposed social reform, and if this is the case, then he may not be overly
72. Of course, even if coerced it may still be his will-coatus tamen voluit.
73. See A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, ch. xii

(10th ed. 1959).
74. Concerning the rule of law doctrine, see Symposium on the Rule (~f Law, 59 MICH. L.
REv. 487-613 (1961). Cf H. MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JusncE AND SocIAL R.ECONSTRUCTION, ch. x
(1946); Pound, The Rule of Law and the Modern Welfare State, 7 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1953).
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concerned with the dysfunctional effects of his proposals on the rule of
law. )
Briefly stated, there appears to be a tendency to advocate
administrative operation which is contrary to the rule of law when the
authoritarian educational use of legal institutions is advocated in th e
Soviet Union.
There are, of course, Soviet jurists and social theorists (at least since
the death of Stalin) who have sought to expand legally protected
individual rights . These jurists can be referred to as proceduralists, 75 in
that they generally emphasize "socialist legality" in the sense of "the
prevention, where possible, of wholly arbitrary action." 76 Such
proceduralists can be contrasted with what might be referred to as
paternalists or parentalists who emphasize the use of judicial and
quasi-judicial institutions as a process of authoritarian education and
ultimately the substitution of communal sanctions for judicial process .
The debate between these two schools of legal thought has been
summarized as follows:
In [the] post-1957 period two overlapping processes were at
work; on the one hand, the institutional leeway in terms of
codes, statistics, textbooks, and procedural clarification, was
being made up; on the other, a new trend towards the
substitution of communal sanctions for judicial process was
being launched, with the evident approval of the party
authorities. Tne landmarks of the first were the All-Union
enactments of December 1958, which included new All-Union
Basic Principles of Criminal Law and of Criminal Procedural
Law; and after that the derivative Republican Codes of
Criminal Law (brought out seriatim in the period May 19591961) and of Criminal Procedural Law. The landmarks of the
second were the institution in 1958 of the unpaid, voluntary
guardians of public law and order or druzhinniki, as they later
came to be known; the breathing of new life into the comrades'
courts (which had existed on and off ever since 1919), and the
regularisation in mid-1961 of their status, scope, and
functions; and the widespread reintroduction of collective
probation (peredacha na poruki) which had also fallen into
disuse, as well as of other forms of public participation in the
discharge of justice ('communal defenders' and 'communal
prosecutors ,' commissions for the protection of socialist
legality, street committees and councils of elders, etc.).
These two trends, which might be called, respectively, the
proceduralist and the paternalist, were not, of course,
necessarily mutually exclusive nor, for the matter, mutually
inimical. The effective resuscitation of communal probation
dates from the December 1958 enactments. in addition to
75. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 56-58.
76. I. L APENNA, STATE AND LAW : SOVIET AND
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which it has also been the subject of numerous decrees of the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Court. Nevertheless, they definitely tend to
pursue divergent lines: to take but one specific point, the
comrades' courts can deal with actionable offences without
being bound by standard judicial procedure. 77
The proceduralist, in the Soviet Union, argues in terms of procedural
rights and sanctions, and the rule of law doctrine; the paternalist, on
the other hand, thinks in terms of public censure and communal
ostracism, and the "democratizing of justice." The precise demarcation
of where socialist law ends and where communal action takes over
continues to arouse considerable controversy in the Soviet Union.
The stateless aspect of communism, coupled with the continuing
economic administration of society, requires that the "new Soviet man"
be educated so as to observe the rules of communist life without overt
state coercion. As a functional means for attaining this goal, certain
judicial and quasi-judical institutions are to be utilized in the Soviet
Union to educate deviating individuals, as well as the general populace,
so that the new normative patterns of behavior will become habitual. It
remains to be determined whether this approach, which is advocated by
the Soviet "parentalists," carries any dysfunctional implications for the
rule of law in the Soviet system during the remaining life of the coercive
legal institutions.

V.

DYSFUNCTIONALITY

78

We m 'lY safely assume, from the perspective of the Soviet
"proceduralists" that the rule of law doctrine implies a large number of
complex normative rules in order to relate importantly to the
complexities of Soviet life prior to the realization of true communism. It
would be pointless to assume that such rules could be reduced to a few
absurdly simple ones. But if the rules are numerous and complex, so as
to relate importantly to the complexities of socialist life, it is safe to
assume that satisfactory mastery of them may be beyond the
competence of a part-time effort by ordinary citizens of average
intelligence. The adjudication process cannot operate under a rule of
law unless there is some minim um mastery of the rules and their
various possible applications in the numerous situations which most
assuredly will arise. As these rules become more numerous and more
complex, a judicial profession at some point becomes necessary for their
just application. All members of the general public @bviously cannot be
expected to specialize in this area.
The Comrades' Courts are one legal institution that the Soviet social
77. Campbell, :;upra note 7, at 57-58 (emphasis added).
78. Portions of this section are based on D. Funk, supra note 48, at 84-89.
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theorists rely on to carry out the educational task of developing the
"new Soviet man." These courts have been specifically designed to
provide a forum for the adjudication of minor disputes, where the
adjudicators are members of the general public (preferably fellowworkers and neighbors) of the person appearing before the court. While
this does not necessarily prevent these social "courts" from being
considered legal institutions even though they are not staffed by
professional judges, this does mean that there may be a dysfunctional
effect on the rule of law when mem hers of the general public are used as
adjudicators instead of professional judges. Indeed, it can hardly be
expected that members of the general public can have the same
familiarity with the rules of law as a profession of specially selected,
trained and experienced judges. The Comrades' Courts must necessarily
decide cases on a somewhat ad hoc basis, which is the very essence of
discretionary administration, and therefore is categorically opposed to
the rule of law. Thus, the Comrades' Courts may be viewed as
increasing the role of administration as opposed to the rule of law.
This shift from legal to administrative processes is at least minimally
consonant with the basic tenet of Marxist ideology that the state and its
legal institutions will be replaced by informal socioeconomic
administration. However, our concern here is to indicate that the shift
from a system of formalized legal institutions to a system of
discretionary administration which stresses a form of authoritarian
education may manifest dysfunctional implications for the rule of law.
This tendency appears also when Soviet jurists and social theorists
advocate an increased utilization of the more traditional legal
institutions in order to further the education of the "new Soviet man" in
preparation for communism. Perhaps it is theoretically possible for a
judge to play the role of a detached, independent adjudicator, bound by
the laws on the one hand, and impartially rendering a decision within
the scope permitted by those laws while, on the other hand, lecturing,
teaching and attempting generally to influence the person before him
(as well as the general public) in an authoritarian and parental manner.
However, it seems much more likely that these two roles may be
mutually exclusive under most circumstances. When the judge assumes
the role of authoritarian parent, he may greatly detract from that
impartial independence that is necessary for the rule of law. And,
insofar as the judge succeeds as an authoritarian educator of the
defendants before him, he may detract from the judicial administration
according to the rule of law.
The selection of a particular sentence to fit a specific defendant is not
ordinarily part of the rule of law doctrine. However, in most Western
legal systems maximum and minimum limits for sentences are
ordinarily prescribed, and within these limits the judge may be free to
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select the sentence most appropriate to the particular crime and the
specific defendant. Although the selection of a particular sentence for a
specific defendant is not part of the rule of law doctrine, the idea that
this selection must be based on the criminal acts of the defendant is,
indeed, an integral part of the rule of law. When the judge selects the
appropriate sentence, not merely with the view to the immediate effect
on and appropriateness for the defendant before him but also with
concern as to the effect on others present in the courtroom, as well as
the general public, another element of discretionary administration is
introduced. Perhaps in theory the sentence that is appropriate for the
specific defendant may also have the desired educational effect on the
audience, but it seems much more likely that, insofar as the judge
considers primary the educational effect on the spectators, he may
depart from the rule of law and fail to decide the case on those factors
over which the particular defendant had control. To this extent, the
operation of the legal system according to the rule of law is likely to be
diminished and the role of discretionary administration
correspondingly increased.
This result is even more obvious with respect to exemplary or
demonstration trials by which the Soviet courts attempt to use a
particular trial as an "object lesson" for others. Here again, in theory it
may be possible for a "trial" to have the same outcome, whether it is
intended as an example for others or not. But it seems much more likely
that, in serving its avowed positive propagandistic function, this will
not be so. Admittedly, the doctrine of stare decisis . in Western legal
theory can be interpreted as viewing the trial procedure as having at
least three general functions: (1) the disposition of the particular case
under preexisting rules, (2) the extension of these rules to accomodate
the special case, and (3) the instruction of others in a similar position on
the theory that security and certainty require that accepted and
established legal principles, under which rights may accrue, be
recognized and followed. Clearly these functions are consistent with the
rule of law. In contrast, the specific use of a particular trial to educate
others in an authoritarian way implies not just the extension of rules,
but rather an overriding emphasis on the educational use of the trial
and the resulting decision. If the judge intends the outcome to be used in
this way, then this intention will most certainly affect the outcome of
the case itself. Stated another way, the outcome of a particular trial
may not be based strictly on actions over which the defendant had
control, since the judge is likely to be influenced by the educational
effect which he intends his decision to have on others. This again
increases the element of discretionary administration and
correspondingly diminishes the rule of law.
In summary, it can be argued that the use of Soviet legal institutions
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for the authoritarian educational purpose of changing and perfecting
man in preparation for communism generally tends to increase the role
of discretionary administration and to diminish the rule of law. Such
quasi-judicial arrangements as the Comrades' Courts and other
specialized tribunals may invite the danger of informal action without
procedural safeguards. It mav. therefore. be misleading to consider
such development as ~n1 advance toward "popular participation." No
attempt has been made herein to measure tne extent .of this effect,
or to docume·nt by quantitative sociological studies the actual
dysfunctionality caused to the Soviet sociolegal system. There is little
evidence that the Soviets have attempted objectively and by means of
"concrete sociological research" to determine comprehensively the
efficacy of utilizing certain judicial and quasi-judicial institutions for
authoritarian educational use. Clearly, if the social reconstruction of
t he "new Soviet man" is to be optimally guided for the attainment of the
communist state of public self-government, then it would seem
imperative for the Soviets to develop and explicate their own sociology
of law based upon the methodology and ideological constructs of the
Soviet social sciences.

VI.

CONCLUSION

During the transitional period, prior to the complete "withering
away" of the state and its coercive legal institutions, the role of socialist
law and its attendant .sociolegal institutions is conceived in the Soviet
Union as educating and directing the masses in behavior patterns
appropriate for the future stage of true communism. The "new Soviet
man" must be educated and trained to voluntarily observe the norms
required for the continuing socialist administration of the economic
means of production and for the forthcoming stage of public selfgovernment. As Professor Berman has stated, "the main purpose of
official law is to shape, and develop that unofficial law-consciousness,
so that people will actually think and feel what the state, through
official law, prescribes." 79
The trend in the Soviet Union to rely on the judicial system not
merely for resolution of specific legal disputes but also to serve a more
general function as an agent of socialization for the entire
citizenry-educating the public to the major values of society and of the
legal system-may be paralleled by a similar trend today in the United
States, particularly in certain quasi-judicial . and administrative
settings. Indeed, it is quite possible that this trend is a general feature
of legal development in modern industrial societies. "And clearly the
79. H.
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potential function of law as a socialization mechanism has important
implications for the attempt consciously to use legal form and
substance in the promotion of more general social change." 80
The Soviets contemplate a social "habituation" process whereby the
"new Soviet man" will become accustomed to maintaining and carrying
out socialist laws, caring for socialist property, maintaining an
honorable attitude towards the Soviet state, social duty and labor
discipline, and respecting the rules of socialist life together. 81 There is
no express avowal by the Soviet social theorists that this habituation
process is necessarily interactive-it is not intended that the general
populace who are acquiringthe "habits" of approved socialist behavior
should also actively participate in the determination and delineation of
exactly what social norms should be politically approved. Indeed this
latter process is generally viewed unidirectionally within the Soviet
system, in that the social directives of the Communist Party, as
manifested through the operation of certain judicial and quasi-judicial
institutions, is usually determinative of proper socialist behavior. It has
been submitted that this indoctrinational use ·of certain legal
institutions can be categorized under the general heading of
authoritarian education and that this approach to the creation of the
"new Soviet man" may have certain dysfunctional implications for the
rule of law doctrine in the Soviet Union.
From this perspective the quasi-judicial institutions such a~ the
Comrades' Courts and the Peoples' Volunteer Militia might be viewed as
merely subsidiary and advisory organs since they operate fully under
the direction of the professional Party and state officials. However,
overlooking certain obvious privileges, it must be remembered that the
professional members of the Party are also members of the citizenry of
the Soviet State (although a rather elite minority of that general
citizenry). Nevertheless, the old guard must inevitably wither and die or
be replaced. Furthermore, as discussed above, the unidirectional
interpretation overlooks the inherent interaction found in any
sociolegal system where conflicts of interest and dispute situations
invariably arise. Indeed, the Soviet social theorists are quick to
acknowledge that "living" and creative communism is the cause of the
masses themselves. the result of the creativity of collective millions.
In the area of "creative social development" it is necessary, state the
Soviet social theorists, to disclose the existing societal possibilities and
then strive for the realization of those options that most closely
80. E. ~HUR, LAW AND SocIE'J.'Y: A SocIOLOGICAL VIEw 20-21 (1968).
81. See Fundamental Principles of Legislation on the Judicial Structure of the
U.S.S.R., and Union and Autonomous Republics, art. 3, " 1 (1958), transl,ated in H.
BERMAN, supra note 7, at 305.
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approximate the requirements for the steady and progressive
development of the Soviet society. The general direction of this
creativity is determined by the leadership of the Communist Party,
which in turn must rely on modern scientific social theory. The Soviet
social theo~ists believe that the Marxist-Leninist theory, in reflecting
the general laws of social development, makes it possible to use those
laws in practice to foresee the basic directions of historical
development, and to determine the most appropriate ways and means
of building communism. However, in practice this societal construction
is always a many faceted and contradictory process that must be under
the Party's constant observation so that one may know precisely where
and when there appear various difficulties and new contradictions,
whether distortions and weak links are arising, and where, on the other
hand, progressive "growth points" arise. The Soviet social sciences have
the collective obligation of showing the causes of these phenomena, of
studying the favorable as well as the negative factors, and of helping to
disclose the realization of the activity of the masses which includes
those creative potentialities that are inherent in the socialist system.
Legal institutions-such as the courts, certain sociolegal
organizations, laws, and implied sanctions-may serve many functioP ~
within a complex social system. This article has suggested a sociologica..
typology which tentatively divides these functions into nine categories,
which can be used to analyze modern legal systems and to clarify
certain interactional aspects of such dynamic ongoing systems.
Although the self-actualizing function of law has been discusse'1. in this
brief outline as characteristic of the role of law in the Soviet system, it
is submitted that this same function exists with varying degrees of
emphasis in all other modern legal systems.
Obviously, this article has only brushed the surface of a vast area of
sociological jurisprudence where much research and comparative
analysis is needed. Thurman Arnold once described the judicial trial in
Western society as a "series of object lessons and examples .... It is the
way in which society is trained in right ways of thought and action, not
by compulsion, but by parables which it interprets and follows
voluntarily." 82 The extent to which this statement is valid needs to be
empirically tested. Future sociolegal research in this general area
should include a comprehensive comparative analysis of the
effectiveness of the educational and heuristic use of legal institutions in
other social systems, and an analysis of the extent to which emphasis
placed on the various functions of law within a legal system represent a
particular concept of man and of the perfectibility of human nature. To
paraphrase Rousseau: Whoso would undertake to give legal institutions
82.
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to a People must work with full consciousness that he has set himself to
change, as it were, the very stuff of human nature. 83

..o---------~ Behavior :1

~/~

Law12~ /~av~
Law 'n

Beh aviorn

83. See Rousseau, supra note 1, at 205.
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